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 On the final day of the 2011 
Major League Baseball season, in historic 
fashion, the Tampa Bay Rays snatched a 
playoff berth from the Boston Red Sox.  
After being nine games back entering 
September, and trailing by seven runs 
entering the 8th inning, the Rays accom-
plished the equivalent of a baseball mira-
cle.  The stories the next day, of course, 
were the heroic efforts of the gritty team 
that wouldn’t die and the historic down-
fall of the Red Sox, who in their own 
game entered the 9th inning leading by a 
run.  Under the surface of this comeback 
story however, was Dan Johnson, a 32 
year old journeyman bench player who’s 
batting average was a mere .119 and OBP 
just .187.  Down to his final strike, the 
unexpected Johnson delivered perhaps the 
biggest hit of his career – a two-run, two-
out homerun which sent the game and the 
Rays’ season into extra innings.  From 
here, a much larger star in Evan Longoria 
would play the role of hero, but had it not 
been for Johnson’s blast, the Rays would-
n’t have lived to fight another day. 
 In a post-Moneyball world, 
where most of baseball has adapted and 
incorporated the use of sabermetrics and 
other advanced statistics into their talent 
evaluations, the slightest advantage is 
paramount.  Dan Johnson’s pinch-hit 
homerun demonstrated the importance of 
bench play and just how critical the five 
extra, often overlooked, men can be.  The 
question becomes: just how important is 
bench play? How much have the most 
successful, often times large-market 
teams, in the game benefited from the 
play of their reserves?   
 In order to best establish the 
value of a bench, the value of the collec-
tive parts that make up that bench must 
first be determined.  We can accurately 
define the value of a player by utilizing a 
statistic known as Wins Above Replace-
ment Player, or WAR.  Unique in its abil-
ity to combine a variety of offensive and 
fielding statistics into a single, under-
standable number, WAR establishes a 
“value” for an individual that, in theory, 
is the amount of wins he contributes to 
his team over that of the “replacement 
player,” or average AAA free agent.  In 
Major League Baseball, the common un-
derstanding regarding this relatively new 
statistic is that all-star level production 
will add 5 wins above a replacement 
player, a normal starter will contribute 2 
extra wins, and a reserve will help supply 
anywhere from 0 to 2 wins over replace-
ment.  When a player has a negative 
WAR, they are detracting from a team’s 
success by reducing the number of total 
wins. 
 By determining the individual’s 
“value” as defined by how many wins 
they add to a given team, one can predict 
some margin of success or failure.  While 
of course, WAR is an imperfect metric 
which doesn’t account for base running 
and situational statistics, over the long-
term, it can be a strong tool for compar-
ing players and boiling a lot of infor-
mation down into a simple, concise num-
ber.  
 For this specific question of 
whether bench production correlates to 
team success, I decided to analyze the 
division winning teams from the past 5 
years.  I compared their team WAR, con-
tributed by all position players, and then 
determined the WAR of each team’s 
“bench,” defined by any position player 
who was a nonstarter.  After compiling 
the data, I determined the percentage of 
each team’s WAR contributed by their 
bench, in order to essentially develop a 
sense of how much the reserves as a 
whole contributed to the overall position-
al-players’ WAR.  Finally, I graphed the 
results alongside the team’s overall win-
ning percentage and looked to find a cor-
relation.   
 Interestingly, the correlation 
 
 Benchwarmers? 
Just how important is this often forgotten aspect of an MLB team? 
By Gabriel Cassillo, ILR ’ 15  
   gmc74@cornell.edu 
The LA Angels on the bench: how much of an impact do they have on their team? 
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between bench WAR and Winning Per-
centage appears to be weak at best.  
While teams with higher percentages of 
their offensive WAR do tend to have a 
higher winning percentage, such as the 
2007 Los Angeles Angels, other teams 
such as the 2010 Texas Rangers, wound 
up having one of the most successful reg-
ular seasons of the past 5 years, all while 
utilizing a bench which in theory lost the 
team nearly 2.5 games.   
Furthermore, of the past 30 divi-
sion winners, only 12 of these ball clubs 
have had 6%+ come from their bench.  
Does this suggest that bench WAR has no 
effect on success?  No, not necessarily.  
However, when we examine this trend in 
the context of overall payroll, we find that 
rarely are the top teams in bench WAR 
among the highest spenders in the game.  
In fact, from the 12 teams who derived 
6% or more of their offensive WAR from 
their bench production, none, that’s right 
NONE, were among the top five in total 
payroll that year.   
This trend is small in sample 
size, yet is significant in that it clearly and 
vehemently rejects the notion of spending 
big on a team’s bench.  Similarly to other 
examples of this, the lesson, and perhaps 
warning to larger payroll teams becomes 
that, it is not how much you spend, but 
how you spend it.   
What appears to a good idea – in 
strengthening one’s bench – after further 
examination fails to validate the conven-
tional wisdom that “Your team is only as 
strong as your weakest link.”  Despite a 
marginal positive correlation between 
regular season success and a strong 
bench, the fact of the matter is that over 
the course of 162 games, a team’s bench 
will not be the deciding factor in whether 
or not they make the playoffs.  While it 
may be a luxury for some teams, for the 
majority of ball clubs, the allocation of 
payroll towards improving a bench only 
can help so much.  More than anything, 
the numbers and similar lack of correla-
tion with payroll suggest that bench pro-
duction is more or less a fluctuating at-
tribute of a ball club.  In fact, of the 10 
division winning teams in consecutive 
years, 5 of them had an increase in bench 
production from the first division title to 
their second.   
By evaluating the most stable of 
franchises, in terms of back-to-back divi-
sion winners, we can safely focus on 
merely bench production as the single 
changing variable.  While not always the 
case, most successful teams maintain a 
similar identity following a successful 
season.  Because of this, and the fact that 
only 50% of consecutive division winning 
ball clubs had an increase in their percent-
age of offensive WAR as contributed by 
their bench, we can safely say that the 
presence of strong reserves on a roster 
and their contribution to their teams suc-
cess is more due to luck and situation, 
than to skill or even amount of resources 
devoted to them.   
In the end, because of the recent 
trends in Major League Baseball when 
analyzing the most successful, division 
winning teams of the past five years, I 
would strongly recommend that teams, 
regardless of payroll, invest minimally in 
their bench.  While important to give reg-
ulars a rest, and to provide isolated skills 
at various points in the game, the bench 
as a collective unit just does not have 
enough of an impact on a team’s success 
over the course of a 162 game season.   
On that September night as Dan 
Johnson rounded the bases and tied the 
game, sending the Tampa Bay Rays into 
extra innings, in the dramatics of the mo-
ment, one might be drawn to the heroic 
nature of the pinch-hitter, and see bench 
production as the next frontier in baseball.  
Instead, like the data reveals, executives 
would be wise to avoid using too many 
resources such as time, money, and re-
search when constructing their reserves 
for the ball club.  In the end, the game is 
decided by those who have the most im-
pact: the starters.   
 
Sources: 
Baseball Reference.com 
MLB.com 
ESPN.com 
 
Dan Johnson of the Tampa Bay Rays hit a season-altering homerun off the bench in 
Game 162 of 2011. 
From the 12 teams who derived 6% or more of their 
offensive WAR from bench production, none were 
among the top five in total payroll that year. 
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 Every year, fans react (and over-
react) to the preseason performance of 
their favorite teams. The extent of this fan 
interest varies with the sport. In football, 
for instance, most fans are aware that 
starters play very little, and may only see 
full game action in the third or fourth 
game. In baseball, spring training feels 
more like a video game than it does an 
indicator of regular season performance. 
Preseason hockey, however, is an entirely 
different animal. Teams must start at least 
eight “veterans,” as defined by the NHL’s 
Collective Bargaining Agreement. Unlike 
football, players are involved for the en-
tire game, often receiving similar playing 
time to what they will receive in the sea-
son to come. Coaches will also use the 
preseason to allow different line combi-
nations and defensive pairings to develop 
chemistry. When a team’s top players 
don’t perform in these games or when a 
team struggles to score goals (or defend 
them), fans often overreact and imagine 
that they’re in for a long season. Like-
wise, a strong preseason can give fans 
hope that it will finally be the year that 
their team breaks through.  
 I took a look at the last fourteen 
Stanley Cup champions to see if their 
preseason performance was any indica-
tion of the season to come (Figure 1, 
above). 
 Overall, the eventual Cup 
champs have a combined 62-32-13 rec-
ord, which means they earned at least one 
point in 70% of their preseason games. 
As for the regular season, these teams 
compiled a record of 670 wins, 305 loss-
es, and a combination of 173 ties and 
overtime/shootout losses. This is good 
enough for a point percentage of around 
73.4%. Thus, it would seem as though 
regular season performance is strongly 
correlated with preseason results.  
  Let’s break down the records by 
conference rank. Teams that won their 
conference (and went on to win the Cup)  
were a combined 24-14-4. The second 
place finishers went 13-9-5, while the 
third seeded teams were 16-5-3, a record 
no doubt influenced by the 8-0-1 Red 
Wings in 1996/97. Finally, the two fourth 
place teams achieved a 9-4-2 mark. What 
does this tell us?  
If a team is going to win the 
Stanley Cup, it does help to have a win-
ning preseason record. Ten of the four-
teen teams on the above list had a win-
ning record, and all but ONE of them 
were .500 or better.  
Predicting the regular season is a 
little sketchier. The best preseason team 
(96-97 Detroit) was only good enough for 
the third spot in the Western Conference 
that season. 
 
The Importance of  
Preseason Hockey 
Are exhibition games good indicators of the NHL season to come? 
By Geoff Rosenthal, ILR ’ 14  
   gmc74@cornell.edu 
Team (Year) Preseason Record Regular Season Record (Conf. Rank) 
Boston (2011) 4-1-1 46-25-11 (3) 
Chicago (2010) 3-4-0 52-22-8 (2) 
Pittsburgh (2009) 4-0-1 45-28-9 (4) 
Detroit (2008) 6-3-0 54-21-7 (1) 
Anaheim (2007) 1-1-2 48-20-14 (2) 
Carolina (2006) 5-2-1 52-22-8 (2) 
Tampa Bay (2005) 4-3-1 46-22-8-6 (1) 
New Jersey (2003) 4-2-2 46-20-10-6 (2) 
Detroit (2002) 4-4-1 51-17-10-4 (1) 
Colorado (2001) 5-2-1 52-16-10-4 (1) 
New Jersey (2000) 5-4-0 45-24-8-5 (4) 
Dallas (1999) 5-2-1 51-19-12 (1) 
Detroit (1998) 4-4-1 44-23-15 (3) 
Detroit (1997) 8-0-1 38-26-18 (3) 
Is the Stanley Cup won in the Spring...or 
in the Fall? 
Figure 1 
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Figure 2 
Meanwhile, the 2001-02 Red Wings 
were an average preseason squad, but they 
ended up dominating the regular season with 
a group of all star forwards and Dominik 
Hasek in net.  
 Statistically, playing an above aver-
age preseason should keep a team in the run-
ning for Lord Stanley’s chalice. Now we test 
this theory by quickly examining the records 
of the teams that finished in 30th place over 
the last fifteen years (Figure 2). 
The thirtieth ranked clubs have a 
combined record of 41-52-12. This obviously 
pales in comparison to the Cup winners’ 62-
32-13 mark. Here, only four teams had win-
ning records while a total of eight teams 
played .500 hockey or better. Unlike the Cup 
winners, there are some putrid records in this 
group, especially the 2001 Islanders and the 
2007 Flyers. Interestingly, the statistically 
worst regular season team on the list (2000 
Thrashers) fared decently in the 1999 presea-
son, their first as an NHL franchise.  
 Obviously, the preseason is a small 
sample size, especially when compared to an 
82-game regular season and a brutal two 
months of playoff hockey. But there is some 
validity in the idea that great teams don’t 
take much time getting in gear for the season 
ahead. Only one team in the last fifteen years 
has won the Stanley Cup after finishing with 
a losing record in the preseason. That’s not 
an accident.  
 
Source:  
ESPN.com 
 
 
Team (Year) Preseason Record 
Edmonton (2011) 6-3-0 
Edmonton (2010) 4-4-0 
NY Islanders (2009) 4-2-0 
Tampa Bay (2008) 2-5-2 
Philadelphia (2007) 1-5-1 
St. Louis (2006) 3-2-1 
Pittsburgh (2004) 2-4-1 
Carolina (2003) 2-6-1 
Atlanta (2002) 4-2-1 
NY Islanders (2001) 0-5-1 
Atlanta (2000) 3-3-2 
Tampa Bay (1999) 4-3-0 
Tampa Bay (1998) 2-4-1 
Boston (1997) 4-4-1 
 
Profit  
Maximization  
in the NBA:  
An Economic Analysis 
By Scott Weiss, CALS 1 ’ 3  
   scw63@cornell.edu 
The labor negotiations cur-
rently taking place in the National 
Basketball Association (NBA) illus-
trate the contention between the own-
ers and players with regards to issues 
like profit sharing.  The owners who 
are unhappy with the lack of equality 
in player earnings and teams’ spend-
ing are proposing a ceiling on the 
amount of money that teams can pay 
players, essentially a hard salary cap.  
By doing so, they hope to improve the 
level of competition in the league. 
The goal of the NBA, like all 
other businesses, is to obtain an eco-
nomic model of profit maximization.  
NBA players are paid based on their 
value to the team, so the higher paid 
players (the stars) are the ones that 
help their team win.  Since basketball 
is a sport in which one player can 
dominate the game, having star play-
ers is invaluable.  If a team does not 
have any star players, it is unlikely 
that the team will be a strong compet-
itor in the league and, as a result, it 
will not bring in as much revenue 
from ticket sales, jersey sales, and 
concessions.   
 However, the largest in-
crease in marginal return comes when 
teams have two stars as opposed to 
one.  The most successful teams are 
those that have more than one star 
player, such as the Los Angeles Lak-
ers’ duo of Kobe Bryant and Pau 
Gasol.  For this reason, teams are 
willing to bid higher prices in order to 
gain a second star player.  The ra-
tionale behind this practice is that, 
with a second star, marginal returns 
will be far higher than they would be 
with one star with respect player 
costs.  The team increases its chances 
of winning a championship by acquir-
ing a second star, as opposed to just 
making the playoffs, and therefore is 
willing to bid large amounts of money 
in the marketplace for the second star.  
This return is evident upon examining 
teams that have played in the champi-
onship games from 2009-2010.  In the 
2010 NBA finals, the Boston Celtics 
played the Lakers, featuring a total of 
four All-Stars between the two teams 
(Kevin Garnett and Paul Pierce for 
the Celtics, and Gasol and Bryant for 
the Lakers).   
LA Lakers All-Star and 5-Time NBA 
Champion Kobe Bryant 
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The same holds true when look-
ing at the 2009 NBA Finals between the 
Lakers and the Orlando Magic.  This se-
ries featured All-Stars playing in it 
(Bryant and Gasol, and Dwight Howard 
Rashard Lewis, and Jameer Nelson for 
the Magic).  As these two championship 
games sample, for the most part, the 
NBA’s best teams are the teams that have 
multiple All-Stars (Sources 4 and 5). 
These ideas underlie the issues 
that are inherent in the league's push for a 
hard cap.  With the soft cap, teams with 
the largest market share will most likely 
bid the most money for the second star 
player, which allows them to become the 
best teams.  In a league where the best 
teams are the teams with the biggest mar-
ket, the league experiences profit maximi-
zation.  This is seen when comparing the 
spending of the Lakers with that of the 
Milwaukee Bucks.  The Lakers are the 
second wealthiest team in the league, 
spending $77 million in 2008 on players’ 
salaries and bringing in revenues of 191 
million dollars while winning the NBA 
finals two years in a row.  In comparison, 
the Bucks, the league’s poorest team, 
spent only $66 million on player’s sala-
ries, brought in revenues of just $94 mil-
lion, and did not make the playoffs.  The-
se numbers show that the wealthier teams 
are willing to bid more for star players, 
and this results in far higher revenues.   
The reason the league’s revenues 
are maximized when the teams with the 
larger market share are the most success-
ful teams boils down to simple supply 
and demand.  The premise behind this is 
that since there is more demand for Lak-
ers tickets, the team can charge a higher 
price per ticket than the Bucks can.  In 
2008 the Lakers charged $107 per ticket 
on average, whereas the Buck’s only 
charged $48 per ticket.  Therefore, the 
league earns more money per ticket when 
the Lakers are playing than when the 
Bucks are playing (Sources 1, 2, and 3).  
This point can be further clarified by 
looking at TV ratings in NBA finals when 
small market teams were playing.  In 
2003 the San Antonio Spurs played the 
New Jersey Nets in the NBA finals.  Both 
of these teams are considered fairly small 
market teams, the Spurs ranking 10th in 
team value in 2008 and the Nets ranking 
26th (Source 6).  This “small market” final 
had the lowest TV ratings per household 
and per viewers of any of the finals in the 
previous 15 years.  Its 6.955 million 
households was almost half the household 
viewership the next year’s finals reached 
(Source 7). 
 If the league invokes a hard cap, 
there will be more equality among the 
teams of the league and teams in smaller 
markets are likely to be just as competi-
tive as the teams in larger markets.  All 
the teams in the league will be able to bid 
the same amount for the second star play-
er.  The teams with the larger market 
share will no longer be paying players 
larger salaries relative to the smaller mar-
ket teams.  This would be a problem for 
the league as whole because the 16 teams 
that make the playoffs might be the 16 
teams with the smallest market share.  As 
the comparison of the Bucks and Lakers 
shows, if smaller market teams make the 
playoffs while larger market teams do 
not, the teams playing the extra playoff 
games are those who are charging signifi-
cantly less per ticket.  This would result 
in the league earning far less money for 
the year.  
 If the league is aiming to im-
prove competition without reducing reve-
nue, it may be better for them to take the 
luxury tax for overspending from the 
wealthier teams and redistribute them to 
the smaller market teams.  This would 
allow for the smaller teams to increase 
their market share, which in turn would 
increase league revenue.  In conclusion, a 
hard cap would force the league to per-
form inefficiently because it would stop 
them from reaching their profit maximi-
zation. 
Figure 1: LA Lakers’ Revenue, Player Expenses, and Team Value 
Figure 2: Milwaukee Bucks’ Revenue, Player Expenses, and Team Value 
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Weather and College 
Baseball Recruitment 
By Will Candell, ILR ‘ 13  
   wmc46@cornell.edu 
This article is adapted from an article authored by Will Candell for Winthrop Intelli-
gence, LLC and is republished with permission from September 2011 The Winthrop 
Digest – a product and knowledge forum to share ideas and tools for athletic depart-
ments. Win AD provides athletic directors (ADs) with the best data and analysis to 
make the best decisions. Win AD provides this original research and best practices 
exclusively to Division I ADs to frame actionable insights for decision makers. Our 
independent research and analysis is available at www.WinthropIntelligence.com/
Digest. (c) 2011 Winthrop Intelligence, LLC - All Rights Reserved." 
 Do warm weather schools pos-
sess an advantage in college baseball 
player recruitment? Intuitively, we can all 
surmise the short answer: how could they 
not? Given the nature of the sport, colleg-
es situated in more temperate climates are 
better equipped for training and develop-
ment, rendering their teams perennially 
stronger and thus their programs more 
appealing to top high school recruits. 
This explanation seems plausible, and 
without need for much further considera-
tion. What is not so conspicuous, howev-
er, is the very scope of the recruitment 
advantage enjoyed by warm weather 
schools. Just how advantaged are these 
programs? 
 In order to explore this topic 
empirically, we first must control for 
factors other than weather that could in-
fluence program desirability. The most 
obvious example is the ever-subjective 
“reputation factor.” High school players 
may simply be drawn to one school over 
another due to the school's standing as an 
athletic powerhouse. For this reason, we 
will only compare colleges from the six 
major colligate conferences: ACC, Big 
East, SEC, Big Ten, Big Twelve, and Pac 
10.  All schools in these conferences are 
of chief athletic caliber, and collectively 
maintain a stranglehold on the high 
school baseball recruitment scene. 
 
Is the beautiful South Carolina weather a 
factor in their recruitment (and on-field) 
success? 
 10 Sports, Inc.   
In fact, according to Baseball America, 
schools in these “Big Six” conferences 
laid claim on 77 of the top 100 high 
school recruits in 2010. Conveniently 
enough, insofar as our analysis of weather 
is concerned, these major conferences 
also (generally) represent six different 
geographical regions in the United States: 
Atlantic Coast, Northeast, Southeast, 
Midwest, Southwest, West (respectively). 
 Holding school reputation con-
stant, we can operate under the null as-
sumption that there is no palpable driving 
force swaying a player from one confer-
ence to another. Thus, we would expect 
that any given Big Six conference would 
have roughly an equal probability of re-
cruiting a top high school player.  By this 
logic, of the 77 top high school players 
committing to one of the six major con-
ferences in 2010, approximately 13 would 
commit to each conference.  Of course, 
theory does not always translate to actual-
ity, and the real distribution was as fol-
lows: 
 
At first glance, these figures seem like a 
far cry from the expected values. The 
SEC and Pac 10 were inundated with 
high school talent, while the Big East and 
Big 10 lagged far behind.  
 But to evaluate whether this dis-
tribution is of real statistical significance, 
and not just attributable to sampling error 
(that is, the recruitment distribution in 
2010, for whatever reason, was an aberra-
tion), we can conduct a chi-squared test 
for goodness of fit. This statistical test 
assesses the extent to which an observed 
distribution of outcomes falls into line 
with the expected distribution of out-
comes. In this case, the chi-squared value 
is 37.1, which equates to the sum of the 
square of the differences between all ob-
served and expected values, divided by 
the expected values. Given the fact that 
we have six subjects (conferences) in this 
study, any chi-squared value greater than 
20.5 indicates less than a .01% chance 
this distribution occurred by happen-
stance. Thus, there is a 99.99% that top 
high school recruits do not choose ran-
domly among these six conferences.  
 
Of course, our statistical analysis to this 
point has mentioned nothing regarding 
weather. Granted, we have established 
that recruits favor certain conferences 
over others, but we are unsure if weather 
is indeed the factor propagating this 
skewed distribution. To further assess this 
matter, we can find the average tempera-
tures (degrees Fahrenheit) in cities where 
each school is situated. Averages, sorted 
by conference, are as follows:  
 
 Next, we can run a regression 
between the aforementioned number of 
recruits in each conference (response var-
iable) and the average temperature for 
each conference (predictor variable). The 
resulting regression equation is as fol-
lows: 
 
Number of recruits = -.98.3 + 1.93 
(Average temperature) 
 
 Standing alone, this equation 
means relatively little. We do know that 
average temperature 
and number of re-
cruits are positively 
correlated (on aver-
age, the number of 
recruits increases by 
1.93 for each in-
crease in degree 
Fahrenheit), but this 
tells us nothing of 
the relationship’s statistical significance.  
 What is extremely profound in 
our findings is a t-value of 10.9. A t-value 
represents the number of standard errors 
(or standard deviations) the slope falls 
above a hypothesized slope of 0. 10.9 
standard errors is considered exceptional-
ly large. Thus, if absolutely no correlation 
between the two variables existed, this 
slope would virtually represent a statisti-
cal impossibility.  
 Moreover, the r-squared value 
is .848, indicating that nearly 85% of the 
variance in number of recruits commit-
ting to each conference can be attributed 
to the average weather in that conference. 
Succinctly put, the relationship between 
these two variables is immense and inar-
guably significant.  
 
 Granted, these results represent 
only one year of recruitment, yet the near 
perfect correlation observed indicates a 
pattern that transcends pure chance. In 
short, warm weather schools have a mo-
mentous advantage in college baseball 
recruitment. 
 
Sources: 
 
November 18, 2010. Glassey, Conor and 
Rode, Nathan. Early Signing Period 
Wrapup: High School Top 100.  
 
Weather.com 
SEC 28 
Pac 10 18 
ACC 14 
Big 12 12 
Big East 4 
Big 10 1 
SEC 62.4 
Pac 10 61.0 
ACC 59.5 
Big 12 57.4 
Big East 55.2 
Big 10 49.6 
Nearly 85% in the variance in number of 
recruits committed to each conference 
can be attributed to the average weather 
in that conference. 
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THE MLB DRAFT: 
The Growing Importance of 
(and Spending on)  
this Mechanism of  
Talent Acquisition 
 12 Sports, Inc.   
 
Draft Bonuses 
What accounts for record high spending? ( Part I of our MLB Draft Coverage)  
By Alex Smith, ILR ’ 1 5  
  aws77@cornell.edu 
 After being selected as the first 
overall pick of the 2011 Major League 
Baseball Amateur Draft, UCLA right-
handed pitcher Gerrit Cole received a rec-
ord $8.5 million signing bonus.  In the 
coming months, Major League Baseball 
team  spending records would not only be 
broken, but obliterated.   In total, Major 
League teams guaranteed newly drafted 
players $236 million, destroying the previ-
ous record set in 2010, which amounted to 
only $201 million.   Also, the single team 
record was broken by the Pittsburgh Pi-
rates, who doled out $18 million to their 
draftees.   In 2011, ten different teams 
spent $10 million or more on players, with 
only one first round draft pick not signing.  
Although there was an increasing trend 
toward higher draft spending in recent 
years, 2011 draft spending was an explo-
sion.   The questions now are “where did 
all of this spending come from?” and  
“what motivated teams to open their wal-
lets to such an extent this past June?”  
 To answer these questions, one 
must take a multifaceted look at what hap-
pened.   There are several reasons behind 
this ever-increasing phenomenon, charac-
terized by intense speculation.   First of all, 
the Major League Baseball informal slot-
ting system, or lack thereof, allows teams 
to pay players whatever they feel is right, 
regardless of where the player is drafted.   
In recent years, college baseball has risen 
in the national spotlight, with added media 
exposure through networks such as ESPN 
and Fox Sports increasing its fan base.  
The lure of actually going to college is 
greater than ever for the most talented high 
school prospects.   Using the threat of go-
ing to college, high school prospects now 
have a significant amount of leverage to 
bargain for higher signing bonuses.   
Knowing that these top high school players 
might actually choose to attend school and 
that there is no formal slotting system in 
place, many Major League teams use high 
bonuses to keep players from going to col-
lege.   A great example of this was Josh 
Bell, who actually wrote a letter to Major 
League Baseball claiming that he fully 
planned on attending the University of 
Texas.  Before the draft, Bell was seen as 
an unsignable player and therefore fell to 
the second round, where he was chosen by 
the Pirates.  Knowing full well that Bell 
intended to attend school, the Pirates of-
fered Bell a $5 million bonus, a record for 
a 2nd round pick, and Bell decided to skip 
out on his full scholarship after all.     
 This system, however, might not 
be in place in 2012.   With the CBA to 
expire after 2011, recent statements from 
Commissioner Bud Selig’s office suggest 
that a hard slotting system may be enacted 
as early as next June.  This hard slotting 
system would determine the maximum 
amount teams could pay a player based on 
where he was drafted.  The reason for the 
change is that many feel the competitive 
balance of the league is adversely affected 
without a hard slotting system in place.  
Often, the best players in the draft fall to 
the few teams who have the money to pay 
them.    
It is more affordable to pay younger players more lav-
ish bonuses than to have to hand out gigantic guaran-
teed offers to free agents.    
Tampa Bay Rays’ homegrown stars Evan Longoria and David Price are major reasons 
why the low-budget Rays can compete with the cash-flowing Yankees and Red Sox 
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While this may sound true in theory, evi-
dence from this past year’s draft proves 
otherwise.  In actuality, the small market, 
lower budget teams were more eager to 
spend their money through the draft.  Of 
the ten franchises spending more than $10 
million on draftees, seven of them have 
payrolls under $65 million.   A great ex-
ample of this is the Kansas City Royals, 
who spent $14 million on the draft alt-
hough their team payroll was only $45 
million.  These lower budget, small mar-
ket teams have taken this approach: It is 
more affordable to pay younger players 
more lavish bonuses than to have to hand 
out gigantic guaranteed offers to free 
agents.   The fear most teams have regard-
ing free agency is the amount of guaran-
teed money that is usually needed to sign 
a player.   For a small market team who 
cannot just eat up salary, one bad signing 
could hinder a franchise for years.   Alt-
hough there are a few exceptions like 
Danny Hultzen, the second overall pick of 
the Mariners, or third overall pick Trevor 
Bauer of the Diamondbacks, most draft-
ees do not receive guaranteed money 
aside from their bonuses.  Since signifi-
cantly less guaranteed money is commit-
ted to a draft pick than a free agent; a 
draft pick presents a less risky commodi-
ty. Teams like the Royals and the six oth-
er “low budget” teams who spent big 
money on the draft are trying to emulate 
the success of the Tampa Bay Rays, who 
made it all the way to the World Series in 
2008, despite having the second lowest 
opening day payroll in the league.  The 
Rays’ success can be primarily attributed 
to players who were drafted originally by 
the franchise such as Evan Longoria, B.J. 
Upton, Carl Crawford, David Price, and 
others.   Although the New York Yankees 
were crowned World Champions in 2009 
with a team that had  one of the highest 
payrolls in the league and an influx of free 
agents, the recent trend repeated itself in 
2010 with the San Francisco Giants.   The 
Giants were carried in the playoffs by a 
core of homegrown players like Tim 
Lincecum, Matt Cain, and Buster Posey.   
Looking at the success of the Giants and 
the Rays, other teams with lower budgets 
are trying to emulate them and develop 
homegrown stars of their own.  
Also, the amount of scouting and 
research that goes into the draft has in-
creased dramatically in recent years, with 
teams feeling more confident about their 
draft picks than ever before.   National 
tournaments and showcase events such as 
the Perfect Game All America Classic, the 
East Coast Pro Showcase, Area Code 
Games, or the WWBA World Wood Bat 
Championships, allow top players to com-
pete against each other all summer long, 
giving scouts a better evaluation of a play-
er’s true abilities.   New technology also 
allows scouts and executives to better 
evaluate a player’s swing or pitching de-
livery.  The days of a player being drafted 
solely based on the word of his local area 
scout no longer exist.   
 However, not all teams are buy-
ing into this new trend toward higher draft 
spending.  The Detroit Tigers and the Chi-
cago White Sox both spent less than $3 
million on their draft picks, despite having 
over $100 million payrolls.  This shows 
that certain wealthy teams believe it to be 
more efficient and effective to pursue 
talent through trades and free agency than 
via the draft.  The Tigers have made head-
lines in recent years through trades such 
as the one that landed slugger Miguel 
Cabrera and free agent signings like that 
of closer Jose Valverde.  Similarly, the 
White Sox have attempted to improve 
their roster through the signing of veteran 
players like Adam Dunn.  Yet, one could 
not claim that all big market teams avoid 
large spending in the draft, as the Boston 
Red Sox were one of the 10 teams who 
spent over $10 million in the 2011 draft.  
The dilemma of deciding where an organ-
ization should spend its money is truly 
decided on a team-by-team basis.   
 With an upcoming vote likely to 
occur on whether or not a formal draft 
slotting system should be implemented, 
the question Major League Baseball 
should be asking itself is, “Does draft 
spending promote parity in the sport?”  
Draft spending allows for greater flexibil-
ity for teams to build their roster and de-
velop their own talent providing teams 
with an alternative way to improve their 
rosters, as opposed to free agency and 
trades.   Yet, one may claim that a contin-
uous increase in draft spending will even-
tually just help the larger market teams.  
As long as there is no formal slotting sys-
tem in place, teams willing to pay will 
always end up with the most talented 
players.   Will high budget, big market 
teams like the Yankees and Phillies even-
tually decide to use their resources in the 
draft and pay for the top prospects?  If the 
2011 draft proves anything, it is that low-
er-budget, small market teams at the mo-
ment seem more willing to hand out big 
bucks to their draft prospects than their 
higher budget, big market counterparts.  A 
formal slotting system would only limit 
the amount these teams are able to spend, 
bringing the factor of college baseball 
back into play.  With limits on the amount 
of money teams can allocate towards the 
draft, will high school players just decide 
to go to college?  This question, as well as 
several others, will need to be addressed 
and discussed at the upcoming CBA 
meetings.  It will be up to Major League 
Baseball to decide what is right for the 
future of the draft and the league. 
 
Sources:  
http://www.baseballamerica.com/today/
draft/news/2011/2612233.html 
 
http://content.usatoday.com/sportsdata/
baseball/mlb/salaries/team 
http:// 
www.mlbdailydish.com/2011/8/17/236903
4/mlb-teams-draft-spending-record-236-
http://www.baseball-reference.com/http://
www.perfectgame.org/draft/default.aspx 
http://mlb.mlb.com/news/article.jsp?
ymd=20091215&content_id=7815624&v
key=news_mlb&fext=.jsp&c_id=mlb 
http://mlb.mlb.com/news/article.jsp 
Lower-budget, small market teams at the moment 
seem more willing to hand out big bucks to their draft 
prospects than their higher budget, big market coun-
terparts 
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The Major League Baseball draft 
has endured in anonymity for the majority 
of its existence since its inception in 
1965, until only recently garnering na-
tional media attention. This, in large part, 
is due to the fact that drafted players are 
typically two to six years away from con-
tributing at the Major League level, if at 
all. Despite this fact, the draft remains the 
premier outlet for acquiring talent in 
baseball. While free agency is safer in the 
sense that organizations can acquire play-
ers who have significant professional 
experience, the draft, on the other hand, 
provides an opportunity for teams to ac-
quire talent at relatively low costs and 
control that asset at a low market price for 
six years. As a result, the draft provides 
the highest return on investment of all the 
player acquisition options – including 
free agency, trades, Rule V draft, and 
international signings 
The question then becomes: are 
certain teams inherently better at obtain-
ing talent through the draft? Should or-
ganizations spend more or less resources 
on the draft, knowing what their potential 
return on investment is? 
In order to answer these ques-
tions certain parameters must be estab-
lished and several assumptions must be 
made. For the basis of this article, we will 
examine the drafts on an individual, year-
ly, and cumulative basis from 2003 to 
2005. This is certainly a small sample 
size considering the draft dates back to 
the mid-1960s; however, there is a lack of 
data on signing bonuses before 2003. 
Additionally, data after the 2005 draft is 
unfeasible since it typically takes six 
years to confidently evaluate the success 
of players and organizations in a particu-
lar draft. 
Furthermore, a player’s total 
value through 2011, regardless of whether 
that value came with his original organi-
zation or not, will be used for this analy-
sis. Matt Garza is a perfect example of 
this point, since most of his production 
has come with the Tampa Bay Rays and 
Chicago Cubs; however he was identified 
and acquired by the Twins in the 1st round 
of the 2005 draft. The purpose of this 
study is to examine how successful teams 
are at acquiring talent, not necessarily 
retaining it. 
Also, the notion of return on 
investment must be clearly defined. For 
the purposes of this analysis, return on 
investment will be calculated as follows: 
Wins Above Replacement 
(WAR) is used because it is a comprehen-
sive statistic that can be transformed into 
a dollar amount. For example, in 2010 
Ryan Zimmerman produced a 7.2 WAR 
which was equivalent to $28.7 million 
worth of production, or, when broken 
down, about $4 million for every win 
 
 Drafting Skills 
Are Some Teams Better than Others? ( P art II of our MLB Draft Coverage )  
By Mike Parnell, ILR ‘ 15  
If organizations are willing to invest money at the pre-
sent time through the draft, they will save money in the 
future free agency market. 
Theo Epstein’s Red Sox were the most successful front office in evaluating young talent 
from 2003-2005. 
 
(Total Value ($) as per WAR  
-  Total Money Spent) 
____________________________ 
 
(Total Money Spent ) 
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above replacement. In 2010 alone, Zim-
merman earned a 40% return on invest-
ment on all of the three drafts for the Na-
tionals from 2003-2005. Considering 
Zimmerman has provided similar produc-
tion for several years and there are other 
players from those three draft classes that 
have produced in the major leagues, one 
can get a feeling for the types of returns 
that the amateur draft can provide. 
After sifting through and com-
piling the data, there were four variables 
which I chose to measure for all three 
drafts (as shown in Figure 1): the total 
money spent on draftees, the total WAR 
through the 2011 season, the total value 
in dollars as computed through assigning 
a dollar amount for one WAR, and the 
return on investment. 
A quick analysis of 
the data highlights several key 
points. First, the average re-
turn on investment for all 30 
Major League teams was 12 
times their investment. In 
other words, for every dollar 
teams invested in the draft 
they earned $12 of produc-
tion. Breaking the data down to view how 
the individual teams fared emphasizes 
these returns to an even greater extent. 
Even the Indians, who were the worst 
team in terms of earning a return on their 
investment, still earned a return of about 
4.5 times on their investment. The $16.5 
million they invested returned $73.6 mil-
lion of production. On the other end of 
the spectrum, the Red Sox, who earned 
the largest return on their investment, saw 
returns of over 23 times what they invest-
ed. For the roughly $15 million they spent 
over the course of 2003 to 2005 on draft-
ees, they earned back over $350 million 
in production. Of course, viewed from a 
strictly financial lens the Indians profit 
would be considered extraordinary. After 
all, the best stock returns are roughly 
20%, but that is a much different and 
more volatile market. 
To fully grasp these returns from 
a baseball perspective, one must get a 
sense of what $73.6 million of production 
looks like. The top three players in terms 
of value from the Indians three drafts are 
Kevin Kouzmanoff, Jensen Lewis, and 
Tony Sipp. Kouzmanoff, the top player, 
split time last year between Oakland and 
Colorado in a bench role. In this context 
it becomes evident that a return of 4.5 
times on your investment is not quite 
what it initially appears to be. The Indians 
drafts during this time frame are marked 
with a myriad of role and fringe level 
players, none of whom make a team a 
contender. The Red Sox, who by this 
measurement drafted the best of all of 
Major League baseball during this 
timeframe, produced several All-Stars 
and many more household names. Jona-
than Papelbon, Dustin Pedroia, Jacoby 
Ellsbury, and Clay Buchholz were all 
drafted from 2003 to 2005. That list in-
cludes four All-Stars, an MVP, and a 
dominant rotation pitcher, when healthy, 
in Buchholz. These are all core members 
of the current Red Sox team, and all have 
been a major component of the team’s 
success over the past three or four years. 
To answer the focusing question 
of whether certain teams are inherently 
better at acquiring talent through the draft 
requires us to take some liberties. Obvi-
ously, this is a very small sample size to 
look at in terms of drafts, which means 
the data can be skewed due to one excep-
tional or poor year; however, we can see 
the disparities in terms of ability to ac-
quire talent by analyzing the data. There 
is a definitive variation in the return on 
investment for Major League teams. The 
average return was roughly 12 times that 
of the investment, but the range varied 
from 4.5 to 23.5 times. This alludes to 
some inherent difference in the ability to 
acquire talent through the draft. Some 
teams, like the Indians, Mariners, and the 
Marlins (who ranked 30th, 29th, and 28th in 
terms of Return on Investment (ROI)), 
consistently acquired talent at a well be-
low-average rate for the three years. They 
produced few big league players, and 
those that they did produce were mostly 
fringe-level players who have not man-
aged to hold onto a major league roster 
spot during their time in professional 
baseball. 
The Red Sox, Brewers, and Blue 
Jays (who ranked 1st, 2nd, and 4th) man-
aged to consistently acquire talent at or 
above the average rate for all three years. 
Accordingly, they selected several play-
ers who became All-Stars and solid regu-
lars who have produced a considerable 
amount of value during their time in the 
Major Leagues. So, to answer the focus-
ing question, there is considerable enough 
variation in the data to conclude that cer-
tain teams are better at drafting amateur 
talent than others (see Figure 1). 
If certain teams are better at ac-
quiring talent through the draft, then the 
logical question becomes should teams 
spend more money on the draft knowing 
that their return will always be significant 
in the long-run? The answer to this ques-
tion is slightly more complicated than it 
may appear to be on the surface. If teams 
spend more, they will not necessarily 
increase their return on investment, that 
of course would imply increasing returns 
to scale. The draft displays decreasing 
returns to scale since there is a limit to 
how much value a team can acquire. In 
other words, there are only so many Hall 
of Famers, All-Stars, starters, and Major 
Leaguers in every draft. Spending more 
money on an untalented player will not 
increase his likelihood of producing value 
for a major league team. Despite these 
decreasing returns to scale, teams could 
spend more and still maintain solid re-
turns on their investments. The perfect 
example of this scenario is when a team 
has a high draft pick and refuses to spend 
money on the consensus top talent, elect-
ing instead to go with the safer slot value 
pick.  This case is best illustrated in the 
2004 draft with the San Diego Padres 
who had the luxury of choosing first. 
With the consensus top talents (who 
would likely cost more money to sign) of 
Justin Verlander, Jered Weaver, Jeff Nie-
mann, and Stephen Drew to choose from, 
San Diego made the “money saving” de-
cision to select high school shortstop Matt 
Bush. 
There is considerable enough variation in the data to conclude 
that certain teams are better at drafting amateur talent than 
others. 
The Cleveland Indians have struggled to 
both acquire and retain their talent, an 
issue embodied in Kevin Kouzmanoff as 
their top pick from 2003-2005. 
 16 Sports, Inc.   
If the name Matt Bush doesn’t 
ring any bells it’s because he was the 
biggest flop in terms of a number one 
overall pick in draft history. He made it to 
High-A before he converted to pitching, 
where he has seen some success but has 
yet to reach AAA. The oddest part about 
this economic strategy is that Verlander 
and Niemann both cost less to sign and 
Drew and Weaver only cost $850,000 
more to sign, which is in addition to the 
fact that these four players were consid-
ered by the consensus of Major League 
organizations and draft experts at the time 
to have a significantly better chance at 
producing value than Bush. While hind-
sight is 20/20, does it not still seem to be 
a financially and organizationally savvy 
move to spend slightly more now for 
greater value in several years? These are 
the questions that many general managers 
likely pose to their owners, but the fact 
that this is still an accepted practice al-
ludes to the notion that the owners still 
don’t fully grasp how the system works.  
The startling part of this conclu-
sion is that the owners of Major League 
teams tend to be successful due to their 
intimate knowledge of how to invest their 
money, yet when it comes to investing 
their money in something that is relative-
ly inexpensive, produces guaranteed re-
turns that are greater than most financial 
investments, and saves money in the long
-run, they arehesitant to do so. As a re-
sult, the conclusion can be made that the 
draft is an exploitable market inefficien-
cy. If organizations are willing to invest 
money at the present time through the 
draft, they will save 
money in the future in 
the free agency market, 
because the draft pro-
vided them with the 
talent they needed to be 
successful. If a team is 
inherently better at ac-
quiring talent, then it 
should also spend more 
money in the draft to 
further exploit this inef-
ficiency. 
 To a greater 
extent, being able to 
control and hold the 
rights to the like of Jus-
tin Verlander, Ryan 
Braun, and Dustin 
Pedroia is valuable in 
and of itself when free 
agency time comes. 
Teams may be able to 
leverage these types of 
players to sign long-
term deals before they 
reach free agency, and 
create further surplus of value over cost 
in the long term, similar to Evan Longo-
ria’s deal recently with the Rays. There 
are so many added benefits to spending 
money in the draft besides just the pro-
duction value that players generate, that 
the fixed cost of initially signing them is 
negligible in the long-run. Even players 
who never produce at the Major League 
level can have significant value at some 
point in the form of a trade. 
Success in the amateur draft is 
not the only component for wins at the 
Major League level. There are other con-
tributing factors such as international 
signings, free agent acquisitions, and 
trades that determine the success of a 
team’s on the field product. The argument 
that I am making is that if the amateur 
draft produces consistent positive returns, 
is inefficient and exploitable, why would-
n’t owners, who have been known to al-
low their general managers to give Mike 
Hampton eight years and $121 million in 
free agency, reallocate a relatively small 
amount of money to a more rational and 
productive system?  
 
Sources: ESPN.com, Fangraphs.com, 
Baseballamerica.com, Baseball-
reference.com 
Figure: 1: Cumulative Data on Drafts 
Figure: 2: Cumulative Rankings 
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 ESPN’s Total QB Rating: 
Redefining the Way We Measure Football ’ s Most Important Position 
By Eric Weintraub, ILR ‘ 14  
  edw54@cornell.edu 
One of the most wide-reaching 
trends in the world of sports over the past 
decade has been the rise and develop-
ment of statistical analysis. Once consid-
ered a curiosity reserved for Strat-O-
Matic nerds, stats have become so main-
stream that we live in a world where 
Moneyball, the bestselling book, can be-
come Moneyball , the hit movie, starring 
Brad Pitt. Statistical analysis has experi-
enced this increasing popularity largely 
due to the advancement of technology, 
which has made the collection and ma-
nipulation of data much easier. Perhaps 
the real reason behind all these new num-
bers being thrown at us is a basic human 
motivation: the desire for greater and 
more complete knowledge. This is espe-
cially true when such statistical 
knowledge influences front-office deci-
sions for major sports franchises, player 
awards, or even bets with friends. In fact, 
stats have become so prevalent in the 
sports world, we have begun taking them 
for granted. 
Right before the 2011-2012 
NFL season, the latest chapter in sports 
statistical analysis was written. ESPN 
developed a new statistic called Total 
Quarterback Rating (QBR), a rating sys-
tem “that takes into account all of a quar-
terback's contributions (passing, rushing, 
sacks, fumbles, penalties) to his team's 
scoring and winning.” This is a clear 
attempt by the Worldwide Leader to fig-
ure out a way to better assess the all-
around performance of a quarterback, 
separate from his supporting cast. This 
effort very well might be a commentary 
on passer rating, the way quarterbacks 
have been measured for the past 40 years. 
Passer rating, invented in 1971, has been 
the best stat up until now to compare 
quarterbacks across the board, as it takes 
into account all of the important passing 
statistics: completions, attempts, passing 
yards, touchdowns, and interceptions. 
These 5 stats are then combined into a 
formula, which produces a rating based 
on the optimal number of 158.3. This can 
then be used to quantify how well every 
quarterback is playing relative to one 
another. Sounds like a good stat, right? 
Traditional QBR doesn’t account for  Michael Vick’s ability to run the football. 
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Unfortunately, like all stats in 
the world, passer rating does not paint a 
perfect picture in what it is trying to 
measure. In fact, passer rating has been 
shown to be quite flawed in its attempt at 
measuring quarterback play Under this 
old system, all passing attempts are creat-
ed equal, so a garbage-time touchdown 
against prevent defense at the end of a 
blowout counts the same in the rating as a 
heroic go-ahead score as time expires. 
Also, a five-yard screen pass to a running 
back that happens to run 45 additional 
yards for a touchdown counts the same 
for a passer as a beautifully thrown 50-
yard spiral that a receiver catches in stride 
in the end zone. After all, it’s the “same” 
50-yard touchdown in the box score. An-
other flaw of the passer rating stems from 
its name: passer rating. The stat only 
takes into account passing-related statis-
tics, but it ignores other aspects of a quar-
terback’s game that also help determine 
the fine line between winning and losing. 
Michael Vick’s prolific rushing numbers 
do not help his rating at all, and all the 
sacks that Jay Cutler takes don’t lower his 
rating, either. The passer rating seems to 
have a very limited view on how a quar-
terback can help his team win the game, 
and that is where the great people at 
ESPN come in. 
As part of their “Year of the 
Quarterback” campaign, ESPN came up 
with QBR to better assess how much 
quarterbacks contribute to the winning 
cause and correct the flaws of passer rat-
ing. For starters, in QBR, the scale is not 
based on the arbitrary number of 158.3. 
Rather, it is a standardized score out of 
100 that can be interpreted as a percentile. 
If you score an 80 in QBR in a given 
week, than mean you performed better 
than 80% of all quarterbacks’ games. 
Standardizing the scale to measure quar-
terbacks is smart from a historical per-
spective – comparing Tom Brady to a 
player from a less-friendly passing era is 
now more rational with QBR.  
Furthermore, each pass attempt 
is weighted based on the down, distance, 
score and time remaining of the game 
situation in which it was thrown. The 
aforementioned game-winning touch-
down would receive what the stat refers 
to as “clutch weight,” or more practically, 
“Tim Tebow points.” Another aspect of 
QBR is that it uses the principle of 
“dividing credit” in evaluating every play. 
It breaks down how much the quarterback 
contributed to the success of a play, and 
assigns credit based on this evaluation. 
Thus, that five-yard screen pass that turns 
into a touchdown won’t be counted as 
heavily in a quarterback’s favor com-
pared to the more box-score dependent 
passer rating. 
 Perhaps the most progressive 
new feature of the stat is that is also con-
siders a quarterback’s non-passing contri-
butions to the team. Sacks, fumbles, pen-
alties and rushing stats are all looked at in 
addition to passing statistics. Each of the-
se subdivisions of QBR are analyzed not 
by their gross numbers but by their Ex-
pected Points Added, or how many points 
each quarterback play contributes to the 
final score. This value-added approach of 
QBR is based on the concept of win prob-
ability, giving out a point value to each 
play based on how much that play in-
creases or decreases the likelihood the 
team wins the game. Thus, QBR is also 
effective in comparing different lengths 
of playing time across the board. 
All of this sounds great on pa-
per, but how well has Total QBR been 
doing in appraising quarterback play 
across the league? The stat claims it 
measures “contributions to winning,” so 
lets take a look at the correlation plot 
comparing NFL teams Total QBR to their 
winning percentage in 2011. Teams that 
have had more than one quarterback start 
games this season had their total QBR 
weighted average calculated based on the 
individual scores of their multiple quar-
terbacks: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As the plot shows, there appears 
to be a moderate correlation beQBR and 
winning percentage. The correlation coef-
ficient is a modest .64. But for compari-
son’s sake, how strongly does passer rat-
ing correlate to winning?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The correlation looks about the 
same. In fact, the coefficient comes out to 
a similarly moderate .61. Total QBR only 
represented a minor increase in predicting 
winning percentage. Of course, this statis-
tical method isn’t perfect. It only shows 
data from eight weeks of an NFL season, 
so it’s hardly a significant sample size to 
draw any viable conclusions. Also, quar-
terbacking is not the only ingredient in 
the winning mix. Supporting skill players, 
team defense and coaching also play sig-
nificant roles in the outcome of a game. 
However, the quarterback is the game’s 
most important position and perhaps has 
the most potential to impact whether his 
team wins or loses. With that in mind, 
there is a grain of truth to the discrepancy 
between the two correlation plots. QBR 
appears to better evaluate quarterback 
play and how this performance affects the 
chance of winning, while passer rating 
seems to be more focused on the accumu-
lation of fantasy points. This fundamental 
difference accounts for the change.  
In football, the stats lie more that 
in any other sport. They tell a very in-
complete picture of what is going on in 
the game. Advanced statistical analysis 
clarified this picture in baseball, and the 
movement has begun to sweep over foot-
ball, starting at the game’s central posi-
tion. It has its flaws and is definitely not 
perfect, but Total QBR is a movement in 
the right direction in uniformly measuring 
quarterback play and telling us, as fans, a 
more complete story. 
 
Sources:  
ESPN.com 
NFL.com 
Total QBR only represented a minor increase in  
predicting winning percentage over the traditional 
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There is a great deal of factors 
that are contributing to the current lock-
out in the National Basketball Associa-
tion. Guaranteed contracts, revenue shar-
ing, and the cap system are just three of 
the many issues that the players union and 
the owners disagree upon. The most sig-
nificant issue that has made it hard for 
both sides to negotiate is the split of the 
basketball related income. Unlike the 
NFL, not all owners are making a profit 
each year. Therefore, they are trying to 
reduce the amount of money that the 
players make under the current Collective 
Bargaining Agreement, while giving 
themselves a bigger portion of the 
league’s profit. 
While part of the owners’ strug-
gles can indeed be attributed to the struc-
ture of the current agreement, another big 
reason for their financial difficulties has 
been their self-inflicted inability to curb 
irresponsible spending on mediocre play-
ers. Over the past decade, multiple team 
owners have handed out ridiculous con-
tracts to players who had no business 
receiving the kind of money that they 
were given. In these scenarios, owners 
brought their financial misfortunes upon 
themselves – leading their organizations 
closer to bankruptcy. 
Let’s look at some examples of 
contracts that have harmed owners and 
have played a major role in the NBA 
Lockout. 
 
Travis Outlaw – New Jersey Nets – 
Signed 5-year deal for $35 million in 
July 2010 
Outlaw was one of the main beneficiaries 
of the spending fest of the summer of 
2010 when many owners felt an impulse 
to give their money away after missing 
out on big stars like LeBron James and 
Chris Bosh. The Nets were one of the 
failed pursuers of LeBron, so they figured 
they’d send $35 million to Travis Outlaw, 
who they hoped would be their Small 
Forward of the future. Their thinking was 
completely illogical as Outlaw only aver-
aged about 8 points per game throughout 
his career and actually showed a drop-off 
in points and rebounds the year before 
they signed him. But the Nets had to 
spend on somebody, so it might as well 
be Outlaw, right? If the Nets are experi-
encing the financial losses that they 
claim, they need to stop spending this 
kind of money on mid-level players like 
Outlaw. 
 
Matt Carroll – Charlotte Bobcats – 
Signed 6-year deal for $27 million in 
July 2007 
The Bobcats finished with 33 wins and 49 
losses in the 2006-2007 NBA season, and 
Matt Carroll was their fourth best scorer. 
They thought that was enough to give him 
a 6-year deal for $27 million in the fol-
lowing offseason. Since that incredible 
season when he averaged all of 12 points 
per game, Matt Carroll has only surpassed 
5 PPG once and he has struggled to find 
minutes on the court because he’s simply 
a lower-level NBA player. Deals like this 
one have caused the Bobcats to be one of 
the small-market teams that is consistent-
ly losing money. 
 
Desagana Diop – Dallas Mavericks – 
Signed 6 year deal for $32 million in 
July 2008 
This signing may just be the most aston-
ishing of them all. Sure Diop is tall stand-
ing at 7 feet, but that’s about all he has 
going for him. The Mavs signed him for 
his shot blocking ability though he only 
averaged 0.9 blocks per game the year 
before. Diop never averaged more than 20 
minutes per game before the Mavs signed 
him and not surprisingly, that statistic 
hasn’t changed since he signed the con-
tract. Fortunately, Mark Cuban has 
enough money to absorb this kind of terri-
ble signing, and still built a consistent 
contender. 
 
Dan Gadzuric – 
Milwaukee 
Bucks – Signed 6 
years deal for $36 
million in August 
2005 
With Gadzuric 
coming off a ca-
reer season aver-
aging 7 points and 
8 rebounds, the 
Bucks thought 
they found their 
man at center. 
Gadzuric played 
22 minutes a game 
for the Bucks in 
2004, garnering 
himself  a $36 
million contract 
the following off-
season. 
 
Bad Contracts! 
 
Imprudent Spending and How it Has Harmed the State of the NBA 
Ben Cantor, ILR ’ 15 
bsc75@cornell.edu 
Travis Outlaw: One of many free agents to receive an absurdly large 
contract in exchange for mediocre production 
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Since then, Gadzuric has mostly ridden 
the bench, and he has yet to have another 
significant moment in his entire career. 
The Bucks are another example of a small
-market team that needs to be careful 
about excessive spending. They can ac-
complish that by staying away from un-
proven players like Gadzuric. 
 
Marko Jarić – Minnesota Timber-
wolves – Signed 6 years deal for $38 
million in summer, 2005 
Jarić’s career year in the NBA came in 
2004-05 when he posted 10 points and 6 
assists as the starting point guard for the 
Los Angeles Clippers. Those are not ex-
actly overwhelming numbers, but they 
were enough to convince the historically 
inept T’wolves that he could contribute to 
their franchise winning games. Jarić put 
up similar numbers in his next few years 
in Minnesota until being traded to the 
Memphis Grizzles during the 2008 NBA 
Draft in an eight player deal involving 
O.J. Mayo and Kevin Love. More recent-
ly, Jarić has been picking up the remains 
of his contract while competing in Europe 
for Real Madrid. Making money for not 
doing anything has made life well for the 
Yugoslavian, on top of being married to 
Brazilian model Adriana Lima. Mean-
while, the Timberwolves have struggled 
to put together a winning team in the post
-Kevin Garnett era. 
 
Jerome James – New York Knicks – 
Signed 5 year deal for $30 million in 
summer, 2005 
Speaking of making money without play-
ing, Jerome James is the poster boy for 
this concept. In the summer of 2005, he 
was the beneficiary of a 5 year, $30 mil-
lion dollar contract given to him by 
Knicks President Isiah Thomas. James 
earned his $30 million by playing in 90 
games over the next four seasons for the 
Knicks. That’s 90 out of a possible 328 
games. Yikes. The Isiah Thomas era left 
the Knicks with a handful of atrocious 
signings, so much so that one of the most 
valuable franchises in the league was non
-competitive for an entire decade. 
 
The players mentioned above 
are only a handful of athletes who have 
received horrific contracts and have not 
come close to producing anywhere near 
what would be expected of someone 
making that kind of money. Owners 
around the league have an incessant de-
sire to spend on anyone they can find, and 
that irresponsible spending has played a 
major role in the current NBA Lockout. It 
is no coincidence that a lot of the owners 
who are spending so much money on 
mediocre players are amongst the owners 
that are losing money each season. The 
owners need to figure out a way to spend 
more sensibly to help solve a key issue 
that is preventing basketball games from 
occurring right now.  
 
Basketball fans are being de-
prived of a sport coming off one of its 
most fascinating seasons because of dis-
sention amongst large-market and small-
market owners. James Dolan and Jerry 
Buss, owners of the Knicks and Lakers, 
respectively, can afford to overpay medi-
ocre players, because they make enough 
money to overcome mistakes at the end 
of each season. However, organizations 
like the Charlotte Bobcats and Sacramen-
to Kings have struggled mightily to make 
profits and therefore, have to be extreme-
ly careful not to invest too much money 
in the wrong players. 
A group of owners of small-market teams 
– ironically led by Michael Jordan – do 
not want to see any concessions made 
from the owners’ side in a new CBA be-
cause their franchises cannot afford it. 
Perhaps, if some of these small market 
teams avoided paying the likes of Travis 
Outlaw and Matt Carroll such a signifi-
cant amount of money, they would not be 
losing as much money, and there would 
be more leeway for them to negotiate a 
new CBA. Hopefully, small-market own-
ers will come out of this experience with 
a newfound knowledge that they need to 
be more careful with their spending.  
 
Source: ESPN.com 
It is no coincidence that a lot of the owners who are 
spending so much money on mediocre players are 
amongst the owners that are losing money each season 
 
Latin  
America’s 
Baseball 
Academies: 
 
Exploring the Bridge to the 
Big Leagues 
Adam J. Kirsch, ILR ’ 15  
ajk266@cornell.edu 
 Since its creation in the nine-
teenth century, baseball has been known 
as a uniquely American sport.  Howev-
er, as times have changed and the game 
has spread across the globe, a significant 
foothold has developed in Latin Ameri-
ca.  As the sport globalizes, a unique 
synergy of talent and ambition has creat-
ed a crucial bond between Major League 
Baseball and Latin America. With the 
development of high-potential youth 
accelerated by baseball academies, the 
region steadily produces athletes with 
exceptional ability who join the ranks of 
professional players.  As Latin America 
and Major League Baseball continue to 
build on an interaction providing dual 
benefits to both players hailing from the 
region and the organization, the founda-
tion enabling the international talent 
pipeline solidifies through baseball 
academies and similar institutions. 
 In April 2007, Major League 
Baseball reported that 208 active players 
on the 30 professional teams hailed from 
Latin America and the Caribbean.  
When considering that the league has 
roughly 850 players (accounting for 
both active rosters and players on the 
disabled list), one-in-four ballplayers 
were foreign-born Hispanics.  These 
numbers are bolstered when American 
players of Hispanic heritage are consid-
ered.  Many of these athletes, especially 
from the Dominican Republic, are 
 22 Sports, Inc.   
Products of baseball academies: training 
camp-school hybrids designed to prepare 
prospective Major Leaguers for profes-
sional careers.   
Scouts are increasingly focusing 
their efforts on this hotbed of baseball 
talent, and there are few better ways to 
recruit the region’s players than a base-
ball academy.  These facilities allow 
teams to further develop the already 
strong base of 
Latin American 
talent through 
specialized train-
ing regimens.  
These academies 
are either day-
boarding schools 
or have long days 
to accommodate 
the dual athletic and academic curricu-
lum.  As opposed to a standard American 
physical education requirement, virtually 
all athletic classes revolve around training 
for baseball.  Positional fundamentals and 
fitness are emphasized. The sports com-
ponent of the learning program is rounded 
out with classes in fields such as sports 
psychology, physiology, and health. 
 However, students at many 
academies follow a classroom curriculum 
similar to most American public high 
schools, including staples such as mathe-
matics, foreign language (English skills 
are stressed, due in part to the aspiration 
for many students to play in the United 
States), Spanish language arts, history, 
and the sciences.  As explained by Padres 
representative Cesar Rizik, the schools 
also provide students with certain skills 
(including basic financial, home econom-
ic, computer, and in some programs, trade
-related skills) that will assist them in 
their transition to life on their own, either 
in a minor league clubhouse or a college 
dormitory.” These skills also serve as a 
sort of safety net, so players who don’t 
make it to “the Show” will have a solid 
education to fall back on.. 
Of course, these academies can-
not operate without experienced and ca-
pable staff.  Former MLB pitcher Edwin 
Correa, whose career was ended by an 
arm injury, founded Puerto Rico Baseball 
Academy High School (hereafter referred 
to as PRBAHS).  He hopes that his school 
offers a better opportunity to play profes-
sionally for Puerto Rico’s dedicated 
youth. Many industry professionals feel 
Puerto Ricans are frequently overlooked 
by professional franchises in favor of 
Dominicans spawned from that nation’s 
numerous Major League academies.  This 
is attributed to the fact that Dominicans 
are not restricted by American policies, 
whereas Puerto Ricans are forced to abide 
by the rules of the United States prevent-
ing them from entering baseball before 
the age of eighteen.  Dominicans, classi-
fied as international free agents, may sign 
at the age of sixteen with a Major League 
franchise, at which point they generally 
enroll in the team’s academy.  Scouts 
identify and sign the most promising pro-
spects as soon as possible, launching their 
The Dominican Republic WBC Team, 2009. With the growth of scouting and training in Latin America, bank on the DR to continue to 
send stars into the MLB. 
Scouts identify and sign the most promising prospects as soon as 
possible, launching their careers.  This allows them an extended career 
in the Major Leagues before retirement, earning money from signing 
bonuses and contracts, which is hopefully enough to benefit their family 
and community. 
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careers.  This 
allows them 
an extended 
career in the 
Major 
Leagues be-
fore retire-
ment, earning 
money from 
signing bo-
nuses and 
contracts, which is hopefully enough to 
benefit their family and community..      
 Because baseball schools are a 
key stepping-stone for aspiring MLB 
players in Latin America, many profes-
sional players who came through the 
pipeline are happy to encourage the acad-
emy system that brought them success.  
Players often give back through donations 
and guest lectures.  For example, 
PRBAHS is supported by prolific current 
and former players, including former All-
Stars Carlos Delgado and Javier Vasquez, 
as well as two-time American League 
MVP Juan Gonzalez.  It is not uncommon 
for retired players to start or work at base-
ball academies after their careers end             
 Major League Baseball is buying 
into the profitability of the academy sys-
tem.  In 2003, Puerto Rico Baseball 
Academy and High School received a 
$200,000 sponsorship from Major League 
Baseball.  In Compton, California, Major 
League Baseball opened an American 
academy inspired by the Latin American 
model in 2006.  The primary goal is to 
introduce baseball to underprivileged, 
inner-city youth, but scouts will have a 
role at the new facility.  Should the 
Compton facility see strong enrollment, it 
will be interesting to see if other domestic 
academies are founded in the future.    
 The academy method’s success 
in cultivating high-caliber talent has led 
to other nations’ adopting the system.  
Asian teams such as Japan’s Hiroshima 
Tokyo Carp have built academies in Latin 
America to lure skilled Hispanics to the 
eastern hemisphere, but the United States 
still remains the top destination for most 
young Latin American players.  Evident-
ly, the academy method of recruiting fu-
ture professionals is a benefit to fran-
chises scouting talent globally. It is less 
obvious that through baseball academies, 
many underprivileged, yet athletically 
gifted youths are able to receive an edu-
cation, and if lucky, achieve a career that 
would otherwise be out of reach. 
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